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Abstract
This commentary argues that scaling fast growth firms drive economic development, even in 
recessionary periods. While the coronavirus induced ‘Great Lockdown’ and its aftermath poses 
particular challenges, we argue that the crisis presents the entrepreneurial scholarly community 
with an opportunity to re-orientate our research. Rather than more narratives of business success 
in the face of adversity, the Great Lockdown presents us with a fresh opportunity to examine 
how scaling is affected by context, by luck and by the porous nature of business growth. In so 
doing, our hope is that it will encourage our community to adopt a more proactive agenda to 
support policy makers and entrepreneurs.
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Introduction
Scaling fast growth businesses are central to economic development; they create jobs, export, 
innovate and drive forward productivity gains even in recessionary periods (Greene, 2020; Mason, 
2020; NESTA, 2011). However, the emergence of the coronavirus induced ‘Great Lockdown’ and 
its aftermath is qualitatively different from earlier recessions, if only because of the way govern-
ments and institutions have directed entrepreneurial activity. Nonetheless, we predict that it will 
encourage entrepreneurial researchers to pursue a research agenda focused on the resilience of 
scaling firms. Concentrating only on how individual entrepreneurs cope, respond and succeed in 
spite of the pandemic represents, for us, a missed opportunity. Above all, the coronavirus crisis 
shows us how context – places, institutions, regulations – shape entrepreneurial activity. In this 
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commentary, we argue for research agendas that more fully connect the micro with the meso and 
macro, for explanations that integrate luck and chance into understandings of business growth, and 
that provide a critical focus on why so few firms fail to scale.
Examining the porous nature of business growth has evident implications on how we engage 
with policy makers. Our standard approach has been to passively advise policy makers to provide 
particular forms of support for scaling firms. However, this approach looks increasingly question-
able. To policy makers and business communities, we often appear rigorous and robust but lacking 
in relevance. We argue that the pandemic – alongside the fundamental challenges presented by 
climate change and declining levels of biodiversity – presents entrepreneurial researchers with the 
opportunity for a step change in how we can proactively engage and support policy makers and 
entrepreneurs.
Why are scale-ups crucial to economic dynamism?
Entrepreneurship scholars have identified that scaling fast growth firms are crucial to economic 
development (Coad, 2009; Coad et al., 2014; Greene, 2020; Henrekson and Johansson, 2010). 
Typically, these are defined as firms with 10 or more employees that have seen businesses turno-
ver and/or employment growth of more than 20% over a three-year period (Eurostat/OECD, 
2007). Although they constitute only about 2%–6% of firms, they contribute about 50% of job 
creation and drive productivity growth (Du and Temouri, 2015; Haltiwanger et al., 2016). Such 
firms also associated with being more likely to export and innovate (Berthou and Vicard, 2015; 
Coad et al., 2016; Coad and Rao, 2008; Grazzi and Moschella, 2018). There are other identifia-
ble features of scaling businesses; they tend to be younger and occur in all sectors rather than 
being concentrated in ‘high-tech’ ventures (Bravo-Biosca and Westlake, 2009; Daunfeldt et al., 
2015; Henrekson and Johansson, 2010; Hölzl, 2009). However, the perennial problem with 
scale-ups is the difficulties in identifying them. Growth is spotty (Brown et al., 2014; Greene, 
2020). Younger firms may only appear to grow faster because of the ‘up or out’ thesis – younger 
firms are more likely to grow rapidly than older firms but are also more likely to close than older 
firms (Haltiwanger, 2012; Pugsley et al., 2019). Few scale-ups show a consistent upwards pat-
tern of growth. Instead, many experience scale-up growth episodes followed by downturns or 
even business closure. Daunfeldt and Halvarsson (2015), for example, describe Swedish fast 
growth firms as ‘one hit wonders’. These ephemeral qualities of scale-ups make them hard to 
categorise and risky to support as what looks like a scaling business today can turn into a zombie 
business tomorrow.
How dynamic was small firm growth in the Great Recession of 
2008?
Following from the last global recession of 2008, studies have explored the dynamism of small 
firm growth (Armand and Mendi, 2018; Bartz and Winkler, 2016; Fort et al., 2013; Peric and 
Vitezic, 2016). There are two basic hypotheses. First, smaller and younger firms exhibit faster 
growth because they are flexible and resilient and, consequently, find it easier to adapt their 
business models to recessionary conditions (Cowling et al., 2015). The alternative hypothesis 
is that smaller and younger firms struggle to grow due to their liabilities of smallness and new-
ness, caused inter alia by difficulties in accessing finance, their limited customer range and 
reach, and their limited product or service portfolio (Davidsson and Gordon, 2016). In broad 
terms, studies show that the ‘Great Recession’ of 2008 had a negative impact on the growth 
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potential of smaller and younger firms (Armand and Mendi, 2018; Bartz and Winkler, 2016; 
Fort et al., 2013; Peric and Vitezic, 2016). Scaling firms were not immune to the impacts of the 
2008 recession. There were fewer start-ups and scale-ups (Anyadike-Danes and Hart, 2017; 
Klapper and Love, 2011; Sedláček and Sterk, 2017) and those that did start-up began smaller and 
remained smaller (Moreira, 2016). However, NESTA (2011) showed that although the numbers of 
fast growth firms dipped slightly over the period 2007–2010, they still provided around half of new 
jobs and had lower rates of insolvency than non-high growth firms. Equally, there is evidence that 
innovative firms were much more likely to be resilient after the 2008 recession (Amore, 2015; 
Cefis and Marsili, 2019).
The scarring impacts of the Great Lockdown
Prior evidence though may be a poor guide for the vulnerability or resilience of scaling firms when 
faced with the coronavirus pandemic. Although we have been here before with other viruses (e.g. 
H1N1, H2N2, H3N2 and H1N1pdm09 viruses) – which hardly makes the coronavirus pandemic a 
‘black swan’ event (Taleb, 2007) – the pandemic has been different from earlier recessions in the 
following four ways:
1. Government imposed lockdowns in many economies has led to predictions of a severe 
impact on the global economy. The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD; June 2020) predicted a 6% fall in global gross domestic product (GDP), while the 
World Bank (June 2020) predicted a contraction of 5.2%. By comparison, in 2009 the 
global economy shrank by just 0.1%.
 Some scenarios suggest that countries may bounce back relatively quickly from the pan-
demic (a ‘V’ shaped recovery). But others point to long term scarring patterns (‘L’ or ‘U’ 
shaped pattern) or – as with the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918–1920 – a ‘W’ shaped pattern 
whereby there are successive waves of the pandemic that interrupt economic activity (Jordà 
et al., 2020; Karlsson et al., 2014).
2. Supply and demand side small firm impacts. We have seen small firms face marked dis-
ruptions to their supply chains and their business networks. For Ireland, McCann and 
Myers (2020) identified that the pandemic has led to missed payments and uncertainties in 
both getting supplies and delivering them to customers. Unlike the 2008 recession, there 
have been direct impacts on both workers and entrepreneurs. Those working in small 
firms often have had to shift to remote working, juggle work with childcare, institute 
shielding practices to protect vulnerable family members while some sadly have had to 
deal with the consequences of becoming ill from the virus. The supply of entrepreneurial 
finance has also become more restricted. For example, an earlier commentary showed 
(Brown et al., 2020) equity finance is scarce, and where it is available it is often on less 
favourable terms (Mason, 2020).
 The Great Lockdown has also led to significant falls in business revenues. Greene and 
Rosiello (2020) found that two-third of UK firms had experienced a fall of turnover while 
German evidence showed that small firms had lost €75 billion in turnover in March 2020 
alone (KfW, 2020). The pandemic affected particular sectors of the economy. Those such 
as tourism, construction, accommodation and food services saw dramatic falls in turnover. 
A lack of customer confidence and continued (localised) shutdowns increased the fragility 
of business revenues. These supply and demand pressures had immediate short-term 
impacts. To stem a liquidity crisis, many firms took on more debt and laid off staff or made 
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them redundant; this did not prevent a sharp rise in business closures. In the United 
Kingdom, Prashar et al. (2020) found as a 70% increase in company dissolutions in March 
2020, compared to March 2019; in the United States, Fairlie (2020) found that 22% of busi-
nesses were inactive due to the Great Lockdown.
3. Government control of the economy. To shore up the financial system after the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, it is estimated that the direct cost to the US economy was US$500 billion (Lucas, 
2019). By comparison, the US initial government spend on coronavirus pandemic amelio-
ration measures was US$1960 billion (Breugal, 2020). Governments have also imposed the 
forced closure of businesses and subsequently placed severe restrictions on how they do 
business. Not since the Second World War have governments assumed such a managerial 
role in capitalist economies. To ‘sugar the pill’, governments in wealthier economies sup-
ported businesses in four main ways. First, many took the unprecedented decision to fund 
the wage and income needs of both the employed and self-employed, extend sick leave 
entitlements and make it easier either to lay staff off temporarily or reduce their working 
hours. Governments also allowed businesses to defer tax and other payments to ease cash-
flow issues and – to support firm liquidity – introduced considerable and wide-ranging 
financial support in terms of loan guarantees, direct payments to firms and grants and sub-
sidies. Finally, as countries began to come out of lockdown, governments introduced pack-
ages of support to retrain workers, to develop new markets and to help ease the transition 
to remote working.
4. New ways of working. The coronavirus pandemic led to the mass introduction of remote 
working and digitalisation. As with earlier recessions, there were some winners – busi-
nesses that were already operating successfully as an online business or were able to pivot 
to online (Arrighetti et al., 2016). Canadian survey evidence shows that some small firms 
accelerated their online sales but others struggled to adapt to e-commerce (CIBC, 2020). 
For some, this is impossible if they operate on a face-to-face basis. Even if they can shift to 
e-commerce, such transitions are difficult if the small firm lacks revenues and has limited 
access to external finance to fund these changes.
The pandemic, therefore, points to scaling being more difficult. Small firms are vulnerable to 
the deep and persistent scarring that the pandemic brings and many – including numerous viable 
scaling firms – have been swept away by the adverse economic impacts of the pandemic. Beyond 
temporary support, further government support is hedged in by their duty to repay the debts they 
have incurred to support businesses through the Great Lockdown.
Out of a crisis comes opportunities
A less pessimistic appraisal of the pandemic is that it will create opportunities for individual firms 
to scale, and for the development of new sectors and ways of doing business. Entrepreneurial 
scholars may also see opportunities to pursue new research topics. One of these is entrepreneurial 
resilience (Herbane, 2010, 2019). Resilience from the Latin, resilire, literally means to bounce 
back (Sabatino, 2016). It is sometimes taken as the response to an external event, usually such as a 
natural disaster or, more broadly, how individual entrepreneurs remain resilient in the face of cor-
ruption or political instability (Dutta, 2017; Harries et al., 2018; Kwong et al., 2019; Williams and 
Shepherd, 2016). Alternatively, it is a process whereby scholars seek to understand the antecedents 
to the external shock or jolt; and how entrepreneurs subsequently cope, adapt and overcome these 
challenges (Bullough et al., 2014; Cheung and Kwong, 2017; Muñoz et al., 2019; Sine and David, 
2003; Williams et al., 2017). These events and processes remain relatively lightly explored areas 
Greene and Rosiello 5
of scholarly investigation. Their appeal is that they follow the well-trodden approach of taking a 
person-centred agentic view of entrepreneurial endeavour that explains how individual entrepre-
neurs overcome the challenges they face. Subsequently, we can expect a stream of research about 
how new and existing firms faced the challenges of the pandemic and subsequently won through.
One fault line with this focus on resilience is that it represents the further reification of the entre-
preneur. Because some of what passes as research in the study of entrepreneurship relies on purposive 
or convenience sampling, we can expect more histories of winners that identify the strategies used by 
entrepreneurs to pivot their business; for example, frugal management of resources, opportunity eval-
uation and enactment. This will generate yet more on how entrepreneurs learnt in the face of adver-
sity, and what explains a ready association between stocks of resilience and entrepreneurial success 
(Battisti and Deakins, 2017; Battisti et al., 2019; Branicki et al., 2018; Ismail et al., 2011; Pal et al., 
2014). In so doing, the role of luck is likely to be minimised. Growth is spotty or patchy both in good 
and bad times (Mason, 2020). Consequently, it is often more correct to talk of fast growth firms hav-
ing episodes of growth rather than being intrinsically fast growth firms. This was particularly evident 
during the throes of the Great Lockdown. For example, demand for at home exercise solutions was 
steady before the lockdown; after the lockdown however,  demand increased markedly. At the same 
time, gyms and personal fitness trainers saw their business evaporate overnight.
The pandemic has also shown us the quintessential importance of context. Welter (2011) has 
described contexts as a bundle of environmental assets and liabilities, with assets being conditions 
that support entrepreneurship while liabilities are stymie or impede entrepreneurial activities. Even 
before the pandemic, it was obvious that those economies with fertile entrepreneurial contexts 
produced better quality start-ups and supported scaling businesses (Baumol, 1990; Sanandaji and 
Leeson, 2013). In our discipline, there are those, particularly if they are rooted in economic geog-
raphy, who point out that place contours business growth, with more dynamic regions producing 
higher scale-up rates (Brown et al., 2017; Mason and Brown, 2014). In the main, though, our dis-
cipline’s ‘go to’ approaches are rooted in Penrosean entrepreneurial strategy approaches such as 
the resource based view of the firm or those with a psychological turn that emphasise the relation-
ships between, for example, individual entrepreneurial motivations or orientations and subsequent 
success (Bullough et al., 2014; Wales, 2016).
The Great Lockdown and its aftermath have shown the limited efficacy of these approaches to 
understanding entrepreneurial activities, behaviours and outcomes. By gazing only at the micro 
determinants of the firm, we miss the wider picture of how the individual entrepreneur connects 
with meso and macro environmental factors, and how entrepreneurial activity, processes and out-
comes are shaped by institutions, place and temporality. We also neglect the role that luck plays in 
growth and how contextual opportunism (being in the right place, at the right time but having sup-
portive institutions and fertile contexts) encourages entrepreneurship. Finally, in the rush to look at 
winners, we miss the vast majority who fail to grow their business.
The woes of the pandemic give us an opportunity to recast how we examine business growth. 
Instead of focusing on a tiny minority of episodic growers, a more holistic approach is to examine 
why growth is so hard to come by in particular contexts. Consequently, rather than looking at rare 
examples of success, we could examine why growth pipelines from early business start up onwards 
are so porous. This is a valuable endeavour because the reality is that the early promise of many 
firms ends up in either stalled growth, or in the disappointments of business closure.
Policy implications
Shifting our focus also has implications for the manner in which we engage with policy makers and 
entrepreneurial communities such as entrepreneurs and support providers. Our standard ‘business 
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model’ is to conduct robust and rigorous research and then write it up for publication, often after 
one or more rejections, in a journal. Our engagement generally consists of a section at the end of 
the article where we speculate on the policy and managerial implications of our findings. This sec-
tion typically sets out what we would do if we had the opportunity to enact change; rarely does it 
indicate what the research has done to affect entrepreneurs or policy makers.
This passive observational approach makes some sense if the Great Lockdown and its aftermath 
pre-figure a further wave of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’. As such, we could see the pan-
demic as reinforcing and accelerating the shift towards digital entrepreneurship and the dominance 
of ‘big tech’, while simultaneously sweeping away swathes of small businesses that have tradition-
ally focused on face-to-face personal service. A benign view of the pandemic therefore, is that it 
just another chapter of the evolution of capitalism as it moves through its cycle of prosperity, reces-
sion, depression and recovery. Consequently, the renting of the entrepreneurial fabric brought 
about by the pandemic in many rich and poor countries is likely to be a temporary jolt. Capitalism 
is resilient and will bounce back. If so, one neo-liberal response is to emphasise entrepreneurial 
agency and ignore the importance of context and of institutions in shaping entrepreneurial activi-
ties. After all, it is the agent rather than the structure that determines change. Another more neo-
Keynesian response is to recommend a range of short-term and recycled support interventions to 
further tease out entrepreneurial successes. So, we could debate the necessary shape and size of 
continued financial support to help scaling firms deal with the ongoing impacts of the pandemic. 
Equally, we could wonder if business resilience programmes are patronising to firms that have 
already developed the resilience necessary to survive the pandemic.
These stances are a misreading of both Schumpeter and the pandemic. Schumpeter appears a 
proponent of laissez-faire capitalism because he saw depressions such as the great depression of 
the 1930s as having a necessary cleansing effect on capitalism (Schumpeter, 1941). This gives suc-
cour to the notion that the entrepreneur is to be set apart and to be applauded because their agency 
shapes our realities. However, Schumpeter (1939) also saw that some depressions were ‘pathologi-
cal’ because ‘abnormal liquidation destroys many things which could and would have survived 
without it’ (p. 149). In such situations, Schumpeter (1934) argued for remedies to prevent the 
‘abnormal course of events [that] are really meaningless and functionless’ (p. 236, emphasis in 
original). Schumpeter therefore, would surely have seen the Great Lockdown and its aftermath as 
‘pathological’. Many of the responses to the pandemic have been radical; they have shown the 
centrality of institutions and contexts. Governments have not been passive referees, simply seeking 
to intervene only in the case of market failures; rather, they have sought to shape, direct and control 
economic activity.
So, what is our response as academics and researchers? We are part of the institutional fabric 
that generally supports and occasionally critiques entrepreneurship. The pandemic offers us the 
opportunity to shift our policy support from passive advice to proactive advocacy. Many of us 
work in business schools and we are often the most likely group of scholars within these schools 
to engage with businesses. And yet, a common complaint among both policy makers and entrepre-
neurs is that we might be robust and rigorous but we lack relevance. How then can we practically 
help scale-ups and policy makers? Traditionally, we have been good at pointing out the frailties of 
scale-up policy design and delivery, but how can we use our insights and the evidence base to pro-
vide relevant solutions?
We need not stop there. The pandemic is perhaps a spur for advocating radical policy directions. 
Arguably, the greatest challenge facing humans is the erosion of biodiversity and ongoing and 
altogether depressing impacts of man-made induced climate change on our environment. So what 
research agendas can we bring forward that will support new radical remedies? For instance, can 
we use our research to bring forward policies that will support scaling entrepreneurs to arrest or 
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even reverse climate change? How can our evidence base better promote the viability, scalability 
and sustainability of circular economy business models? What can we do to support neglected 
communities if we want inclusive growth?
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